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1 Introduction
The characteristics of unemployment compensation systems have increasingly attracted attention,
beyond the interest in the level of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits alone.1 One important
strand of this recent literature has revisited “re-entitlement eﬀects” identified by Mortensen (1977)
as a counteracting force to the standard disincentive eﬀect of UI on job acceptance. In Mortensen
(1977), taking a job opens the door to UI entitlement upon future job loss, and thus more generous
UI makes current employment more attractive in the first place. Recently, Fredriksson and Holm-
lund (2001), Albrecht and Vroman (2005), and Coles and Masters (2006) show that re-entitlement
eﬀects remain valid in models where both the arrival rate of job oﬀers and the distribution of wage
oﬀers are endogenous.
In this paper, we propose a new channel for the re-entitlement eﬀect: the wage diﬀerential due
to non-automatic eligibility for UI benefits. We believe this new channel to be interesting for several
reasons. First, non-automatic eligibility is a feature common to the unemployment compensation
systems of the U.S., Canada, and most European countries, which are all characterized by the
existence of a minimum duration of employee contributions for eligibility for insurance benefits.2
Second, the channel is based on the simple intuition that the wages of employees eligible for UI and
for unemployment assistance (UA) may diﬀer in equilibrium. In addition, as the wage diﬀerential
in our model exclusively comes from the re-entitlement eﬀect, wage dispersion becomes in itself a
natural measure of the extent of re-entitlement eﬀects. Finally, our approach allows us to explicitly
characterize the optimal eligibility requirement for UI.
We consider a labor market matching model, in which the unemployed are either entitled to UI
benefits or to lower UA benefits, and the employees are either eligible for UI or UA upon separation.
UI recipients face some probability of losing eligibility and start receiving UA benefits, and similarly
employees eligible for UA face some probability of gaining UI eligibility while employed. Firms
open job vacancies, taking into account the average compensation received by the unemployed, and
the meetings between employers and job-seekers are described by a standard matching function
à la Pissarides (2000). If an unemployed worker finds a job while currently on UI, she is still
eligible for UI upon future separation, while a UA recipient finding a job is initially only entitled
to UA upon separation. Individuals are assumed to be risk-averse and the budget constraint of
the unemployment compensation system is explicitly modelled. Finally, wages are determined
through Nash bargaining within each firm-worker pair. In equilibrium, as eligibility for UI does not
automatically follow from employment, the two types of unemployed have diﬀerent threat points,
which generates equilibrium wage dispersion. Wage dispersion is shown to vanish in particular
whenever eligibility is automatic or benefit levels do not decrease with unemployment duration.
We calibrate and simulate the model using transition probabilities across labor market states
and earnings estimated on the 1994-2000 waves of the French sample of the European Community
1See for example, Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), Wang and Williamson (2002), Cahuc and Malherbet (2004),
Pellizzari (2006), Pavoni (2007), and Lentz (2009).
2This minimum duration is equal to 4 months in France, 6 months in the Netherlands and Luxembourg, and goes
up to 15 months in Portugal. The most frequent duration, 12 months, is observed in the US, Denmark, Germany,
Belgium, Spain, Italy, etc.
2
Household Panel (ECHP) controlling for individual characteristics. The ECHP has the advantage
of providing all the information necessary to the construction of the monthly series of UI eligibility
for both the employed and the unemployed, together with the benefit level received by each group
of unemployed. We are thus able to precisely evaluate the quantitative eﬀects of the unemployment
compensation system in the particular case of France. Among the countries participating in the
ECHP, we focus on France mostly because the French unemployment compensation system is one
of the very few that remained unchanged in this period. The model is also calibrated using macro
data for the polar cases of Denmark (generous UI) and the U.S. (low UI).
We then quantify re-entitlement eﬀects. For this purpose, our model needs to be compared to a
benchmark model identical in every respect except for the existence of re-entitlement eﬀects. This
model is simply the standard Pissarides (2000, ch. 1) model, which is calibrated using parameters
derived from our model. We show in particular that the re-entitlement eﬀect is smaller the lower
is the decrease in benefit levels with unemployment duration. To assess the extent of entitlement
eﬀects for France, Denmark, and the U.S., we then compare the impact of a same increase in benefit
levels in our model and in the calibrated version of Pissarides (2000). For France, the re-entitlement
eﬀect lowers by 154% the rise in wages and by 254% the rise in unemployment following a 10%
increase in benefit levels. The re-entitlement eﬀect is also shown to be significant for Denmark
(85% for wages and 174% for unemployment) and for the U.S. (respectively, 113% and 311%).
In our model, unemployment compensation can be rendered more generous along four dimen-
sions, namely the levels of UI and UA benefits, the duration of UI entitlement, and the employment
spell required for UI eligibility. An important question is then whether the eﬀects of changing un-
employment compensation are similar or not across diﬀerent dimensions and for diﬀerent countries.
As comprehensive reforms to unemployment compensation are often politically diﬃcult to im-
plement, we first compare “small” reforms along these four alternative dimensions.3 In particular,
we show that raising UA benefits increases the utility of all groups of workers in all three countries,
while raising the level or the duration of UI benefits makes the unemployed on UA benefits worse-oﬀ
in the two countries with already generous UI benefits (France and Denmark). In addition, easier
eligibility for UI is the only reform which actually ends up lowering social welfare in France and
Denmark, while all reforms raise social welfare in the U.S.
Next, we analyze how the current unemployment compensation systems stand with respect to
the optimal systems along all four dimensions. In all three countries, (i) the optimal system is
characterized by time-decreasing unemployment benefits and non-automatic eligilibility for UI; (ii)
the optimal level of both UI and UA benefits is higher than the current benefits, and the optimal
decrease in benefits over time smaller, but (iii) the employment spell for UI entitlement is longer in
the optimal system. Therefore, the degree of generosity should move in opposite directions along
diﬀerent dimensions to improve social welfare. Finally, the welfare gains generated by moving from
the current system to the optimum are small in France and Denmark, while in the US the gains
are large and would lead to a Pareto-improvement.
3All reforms under consideration within each specific country have been designed to produce the same increase in
the expected utility of an unemployed worker.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our model. Section 3 presents the data
and the method implemented to estimate the key variables and parameters of the model. Section
4 quantifies re-entitlement eﬀects. In section 5, we simulate the impact of four “small” reforms
making unemployment compensation more generous. Section 6 characterizes the optimal design
for the unemployment compensation system. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Environment
The economy consists of a fixed number workers normalized to 1, and an endogenous number of
one-job firms. Time is continuous and lasts forever. The entire analysis is carried out in steady
state. Two unemployment benefit systems coexist: unemployment insurance (UI) and unemploy-
ment assistance (UA). As in most countries and unlike in the existing literature, eligibility for UI
benefits requires a “long enough” previous employment spell and lasts only for a limited period
of time. 1 unemployed individuals (also called here the “type-1 unemployed”) are entitled to UI
benefits, while the remainder 2 = − 1 unemployed receive UA benefits, where  denotes total
unemployment. Similarly, 1 employees are eligible for unemployment insurance in case of job loss,
while the remainder 2 = − 1 would receive UA benefits, where  denotes total employment. In
order to keep things simple, transitions between states are here modelled as Poisson rates. We thus
assume that an employed worker not entitled to UI gains eligibility at Poisson rate  and that a UI
recipient exhausts benefits with probability 4 (see Figure 1). The eligibility rules of the UI system
are thus fully represented by  and .
Firms post vacancies and transitions into employment are endogenously determined by a CRS
matching function à la Pissarides (2000).5 Meetings between individuals and firms are then ruled
by:
 = ( ) (1)
where  is the number of job matches,  the number of vacancies,  ≡ 1 + 2 the number
of unemployed workers, and  a parameter representing the eﬃciency of the matching process.6
Given CRS and the standard random matching assumption, a vacancy is matched to a worker at
Poisson rate () where () ≡ () = 
¡
1 1
¢
, with  ≡  denoting labor market tightness.
Similarly, an unemployed worker —whether entitled to UI benefits or not— is matched to a vacancy
at rate ().
4Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) and Albrecht and Vroman (2005) also assume that the termination of benefits
occurs at a Poisson rate. This assumption allows one to keep the model stationary and is not restrictive.
5Search eﬀort is not modelled here, and thus both types of unemployed have the same job finding probability. This
assumption, discussed in detail in section 2.5, is supported by several studies that show that the unemployment benefit
level does not significantly aﬀect search eﬀort. See for example Rioux (2001a) for France, Schmitt and Wadsworth
(1993) for the United Kingdom, and Hughes, Peoples, and Perlman (1996) for the US. Note that Coles and Masters
(2006), and Albrecht and Vroman (2005) make the same assumption, while Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) assume
endogenous search eﬀort.
6This parameter is useful for avoiding an unrealistically large cost of opening a vacancy in the simulations.
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Figure 1: Labour Market Flows
d  
An unemployed worker entitled to UI who finds a job would still be eligible after a future job loss.
For this reason, in our model, a type-1 unemployed worker finding a job becomes a type-1 employee.
In contrast, a UA recipient finding a job does not initially meet the eligibility requirements, and
thus becomes a type-2 employee. Finally, employed workers lose their job at an exogenous rate .
The dynamic equations governing the model thus are:
1 = 1 − 1 −()1 (2)
2 = 2 + 1 −()2 (3)
1 = ()1 − 1 + 2 (4)
The steady-state equilibrium number of individuals in each state is obtained by imposing
1 = 2 =
1 = 0 in (2), (3), and (4). After some substitutions, we obtain:
1 = ()Ω() (5)
2 = (+ )Ω() (6)
1 = ()[+()]Ω() (7)
where Ω() ≡  [+ +()] + () [+ +()].
Finally, the unemployment compensation system is assumed to be financed out of proportional
social contributions on wages, which means that the unemployed do not contribute. Let  denote
type- unemployment benefit and  the tax rate. Then, the budget constraint of the benefit system
satisfies:
11 + 22 =  (11 + 22)  (8)
i.e. the total amount of net-of-tax benefits is financed through a proportional tax  on wage income
11+22. Using (5), (6), and (7), and 2 = 1− 1−1−2, this constraint can be rewritten as:
 = 1() + 2(+ )
[1 (+()) + 2]()  (9)
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2.2 Firms
Firms post vacancies, which are filled at rate (). Let  be the flow cost of posting a vacancy
and  its value while unfilled. Firms cannot post diﬀerent types of vacancies for the unemployed
entitled to UI and for those not entitled as this would otherwise be illegal. Then, the value of an
unfilled vacancy can be written in terms of the expected value from a filled job ():
 = − +()( −  ). (10)
However, once a firm meets a worker, the firm may directly observe whether the candidate is entitled
to UI, or can infer this from her labor market history. Thus wages and the value of an occupied
job are specific to the type of unemployed that fills the jobs. In particular, the value of a job filled
by a type-1 unemployed worker is:
1 =  −1 + ( − 1) (11)
where  is the productivity, 1 the bargained wage, and 1−1 the capital loss born with separation
probability .
The value of a job filled with a type-2 unemployed worker diﬀers from (11) because the employee
gains eligibility with probability , in which case the value of the job becomes 1:
2 =  − 2 + ( − 2) + (1 − 2) (12)
The expression for the expected value of a filled job is given by:
 = 11 + 221 + 2  (13)
where 11+2 is the probability that a vacancy is filled by a worker eligible for UI, conditional on the
event of meeting a worker. Using (5) and (6), we obtain the proportion of the unemployed entitled
to UI: 1
1 + 2 =
()
() + (+ )  (14)
Firms open vacancies up to the point where the expected value of posting a further vacancy is
zero ( = 0).
2.3 Workers
Workers are assumed to be risk-averse with instantaneous utility given by the isoelastic CRRA
utility function () = , where  is after-tax income and  ≤ 1. Let  denote the asset value
of unemployment when receiving type- benefit and  the corresponding value for an employee
eligible for type- benefit in case of separation. In a stationary environment,
1 = [1] +()(1 − 1) +  (2 − 1) , (15)
stating that an unemployed worker entitled to UI gets felicity  [] from insurance benefit 1, makes
a capital gain 1−1 when finding a type-1 job [with probability ()], and incurs into a capital
loss 2 − 1 when UI benefits expire (with probability ).
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In turn, the expected discounted utility for a type-2 unemployed is:
2 =  [2] +()(2 − 2) (16)
i.e. while unemployed, the individual gets felicity  [2] from assistance benefit 2, and makes a
capital gain 2 − 2 when finding a job.
Similarly, we have:
1 =  [1(1− )] + (1 −1) (17)
i.e. while employed and eligible for UI in case of separation, the individual has felicity [1(1− )],
since she finances the unemployment compensation system. Should a separation occur, she incurs
into a capital loss of 1 − 1. The expression for the expected utility from employment for a
type-2 employee is similar, except that she becomes eligible for UI (i.e. a type-1 employee) with
probability  per unit of time:
2 =  [2(1− )] + (2 −2) + (1 −2) (18)
2.4 Wages
2.4.1 Type-1 employees
Wages are the outcome of a bilateral Nash bargain between worker-firm pairs and can be renego-
tiated all the time. A type-1 worker receives employment value 1 if an agreement is reached and
her threat point is 1. For the firm, the expected value of a filled vacancy is 1 and its threat point
is  . The wage 1 solves:
1 (1 − 1)
(1 −  )1− (19)
where  is worker’s bargaining power. Under the free entry condition ( = 0), using (10), (11),
and (17) in (19), the optimality condition for this problem is:
(1− )(1− )1
 −  ( − 1) (1− )
−11 = (1− )1 (20)
For  ≤ 1, the wage bargained by type-1 employees depends positively on 1. As a result, a change
in the parameters governing UI eligibility ( and ) or in benefit levels (1 and 2) that makes
type-1 unemployment more attractive increases 1.
2.4.2 Type-2 employees
Similarly the wage 2 solves7
2 (2 − 2)
(2 −  )1− (21)
7There are two reasons for assuming that UA recipients bargain over their monthly wage. First, the empirical
evidence shows that the wage distribution of former UA recipients is non degenerate in France, since two thirds of
them are not paid the hourly legal minimum wage (Rioux, 2001b). Second, the monthly wage depends both on the
hourly wage and on the number of hours worked. Even though the hourly wage is fixed at the minimum wage, the
number of hours worked can still be bargained over. The empirical evidence shows a significant dispersion in the
hours worked by the unemployed not entitled to UI when they find a job.
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The optimality condition then verifies:
(1− )(2 − 2) = (2 −  )(1− )−12 (22)
Using (10), (12), and (18) in (22), we get:
(1− ) (1− ) 2
 − 
∙
 − 2 + 
µ − 1
 + 
¶¸
(1− ) −12 =(1− ) [2 − (1 − 2)] (23)
The diﬀerence between equations (23) and (20) lies in the presence of , the probability for a type-
2 employee of gaining UI eligibility. When type-2 employees never become eligible ( = 0), the
expression for 2 is similar to that for 1, except that the threat point is type-2 unemployment.
When   0, equation (23) is more complicated, since 2 now depends on 1, 1, and 2, while
1 itself is a function of 1. Therefore any change in the parameters describing unemployment
compensation (1, 2, , ) aﬀects 2 directly via 2, but also indirectly via 1 (and in turn 1).
Numerical simulations show that after a change in 1 or  that makes type-1 unemployment more
attractive, the value of type-2 employment increases more than the value of type-2 unemployment,
which decreases 2.
The mechanism at work is close to the entitlement eﬀect first identified by Mortensen (1977)
in a search framework, and later extended to a matching framework by Fredriksson and Holmlund
(2001), Albrecht and Vroman (2005), or Coles and Masters (2004, 2006). Specifically Mortensen
(1977) finds that higher UI benefits or longer entitlement make current employment more attractive
for the unemployed not entitled to UI benefits, which lowers their reservation wage. The result is
shown under the assumption that an employee losing her job automatically qualifies for insurance
benefits. Our model confirms this result in a general equilibrium setting with endogenous wages
and where UI eligibility does not follow automatically from unemployment.
3 Equilibrium
Under the free entry condition, equation (10) can be rewritten as:
 = () , (24)
stating that, in equilibrium, the expected income from a filled vacancy must equal the total costs
of posting it. Using (13) and (14), we get:
()1 + (+ )2
() + (+ ) =

()  (25)
The equilibrium is then defined as follows:
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a vector ( 1 2   1 2 1 2 1 2) solving the system of
ten equations given by the value of unemployment and employment to workers [equations (15) to
(18)], the value of filled jobs to firms [(11) and (12), with  = 0], the free-entry condition (25),
the FOC of the Nash bargains [(23) and (20)], and the budget constraint of the unemployment
compensation systems (9).
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Proposition 1 establishes the conditions under which wage dispersion arises in equilibrium:
Proposition 1 Let 1 ≥ 2 and  ≤ 1. If UI eligibility is automatic ( = +∞) or 1 = 2 or
 = +∞ or  = 0, the Nash bargaining process yields to 1 = 2. If UI eligibility is not automatic
(  +∞), 1  2, and 0    +∞, then 1  2.
Proof. See the Appendix
Given that wages can be renegotiated all the time, when eligibility follows automatically from
employment all workers have the same threat point and are paid the same wage (cf. Fredriksson
and Holmlund, 2001). Indeed, if an employer was to propose a lower wage to UA recipients, then
once hired the latter would threaten to quit and search to obtain elsewhere the same wage as other
employees. In contrast, when UI eligibility requires a minimum duration of contributions (provided
that unemployment benefits decrease over time, i.e. 1  2 and 0    +∞), the unemployed
not entitled to UI have a lower threat point, which gives rise to wage dispersion.
Wage dispersion is an important feature here, as it creates an incentive for UA recipients to
accept jobs in order to be re-entitled to UI benefits. We thus propose a new channel for the re-
entitlement eﬀect: the wage diﬀerential due to non-automatic eligibility. Endogenous search eﬀort
creates the same kind of incentives when eligibility is automatic (Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2001).
However we believe our mechanism to be more relevant empirically. In most European countries,
but also in the US, Canada, etc., there exists a minimum duration of employee contributions for
eligibility for insurance benefits. Moreover, endogenous search eﬀort has two unrealistic features:
all types of workers are paid the same wage;8 UA recipients search more eﬀectively and find jobs at
a higher rate than UI recipients. The empirical evidence does not support these predictions. For
example, in France, former UI recipients get on average higher wages than former UA recipients
(see section 3 of this paper and Rioux, 2001b), and both types of recipients have the same search
eﬀort and use the same number of search methods.9
A search model where wages are posted by firms can also produce a non degenerate wage distri-
bution, as shown by Albrecht and Vroman (2005). In their framework, time-varying unemployment
benefits are suﬃcient to lead to a distribution of worker reservation wages. However this does not
give rise to wage dispersion with certainty: a degenerate wage distribution is also one of the possible
equilibria.
3.1 Welfare
In the welfare analysis, we compare steady state solutions and ignore the transition among steady
states. Let  denote the steady state utilitarian welfare of workers in unit of the consumption
8The alternative hypothesis made by Cahuc and Lehmann (2000) that wages are negotiated by unions gives the
same degenerate wage distribution.
9Specifically, using the Labor Force survey and the Outcomes for RMI recipients Survey (Enquête Sortants du
RMI, 1998), Rioux (2001a) finds that the proportion of benefit recipients actively searching for a job are the same
for UA and UI recipients, and that among active job seekers, two thirds of both UA and UI recipients use between
two and four search methods. These results, obtained when controlling for personal characteristics, are corroborated
by other studies. For example, Schmitt and Wadsworth (1993) on British data, and Hughes, Peoples, and Perlman
(1996) on US data find that the unemployment benefit level does not significantly aﬀect search eﬀort.
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good:
 = −1 (11 + 22 + 11 + 22) 
Substituting the explicit expression for the value functions (15)-(18) into  and using the steady
state equilibrium conditions (5)-(7),
 = −1 (1 [1 (1− )] + 2 [2 (1− )] + 1 [1] + 2 [2])  (26)
implying that () simplifies to a weighted average of instantaneous utilities.
Similarly let  denote the welfare of firms’ owners
 = 11 + 22 + 
Firms’ owners do not participate in the labor market and are assumed to be risk-neutral.10 Sub-
stituting (10)-(12) in  and using (5)-(7), and (25),
 = 1 ( − 1) + 2 ( − 2)−  (27)
i.e.  simplifies to the sum of profits minus the total cost of posting  vacancies.
We can then define the steady state utilitarian welfare function  as
 = +  (28)
and net output  by
 =  −  (29)
i.e.  simplifies to the sum of gross production net of the total cost of posting  vacancies.
4 Estimation and calibration
The existing literature (see e.g. Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2001, Albrecht and Vroman, 2005, Coles
and Masters, 2006) provides more examples of qualitative eﬀects of unemployment compensation
systems than precise quantifications. Analytical results are typically derived in cases where workers
are assumed to be risk-neutral (Albrecht and Vroman, 2005, Coles and Masters, 2006) or when there
is no discounting (Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2001), while numerical calibrations are used in more
general cases, and they are often constrained by the availability of parameters from a number of
external sources.
Here we go a step further and simulate the model for France using transition probabilities and
earnings estimated on the 1994-2000 waves of the French sample of the ECHP. Being estimated
on the same individuals and the same period, our parameter values are consistent with each other
and moreover account for individual characteristics. However our 4-state model is more general
and applies to any two-tier system with non-automatic eligibility. In order to show that our main
results are also relevant to other countries, we calibrate our model for Denmark and the US using
10Alternatively, one could assume that the workers own the firms. However, under this assumption all poten-
tial conflicts of interests between workers and firms disappear, whereas we show in this paper that reforms to the
unemployment compensation system have important distributional eﬀects.
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the UI eligibility rules and macroeconomic data. We choose these two countries because they
display strongly diverse unemployment compensation systems. The Danish compensation system
is known as one of the more generous among OECD countries. In contrast, in the US, the level of
benefits and the maximum duration of UI entitlement are particularly low.
4.1 Estimation for France
4.1.1 The ECHP (1994-2000)
The ECHP contains detailed information on employment status, earnings, and individual charac-
teristics. Each year in October, individuals over the age of 17 are asked to state their monthly labor
market status (employed, unemployed, inactive) for each month of the previous calendar year. This
allows us to reconstruct the individual (self-declared) labor market history of 9,686 individuals go-
ing back to January 1993. In addition, these individuals provide monthly information on the source
of their earnings (wage, UA benefits, UI benefits, ...) and annual information on the amount of
each type of earnings.
In principle, the data set directly provides monthly information on the entitlement status (UI
or UA) of each unemployed individual. Moreover, the monthly level of each type of benefit could
be computed as the annual amount divided by the number of months of receipt. However, the
information on benefit type and on the annual amounts received is often missing,11 and subject to
significant measurement error when available. Given these limitations, we reconstruct information
on the type and level of benefits received by applying the eligibility rules of the French legislation
on unemployment compensation (see Pellizzari, 2006, and Lollivier and Rioux, forthcoming). The
same method is used to determine whether employees are eligible for UI benefits in case of job loss.
The French UI eligibility rules were fairly complicated (see Table A1 in the Appendix), but
they remained essentially unchanged over the period 1994-2000. Two points are worth noting.
First, most unemployed are entitled to 30 months of benefits, even if eligibility for UI requires 4
months of employment during the 8 months preceding the unemployment spell, in which case the
unemployed is entitled to 4 months. Second, if a UI recipient finds a job before exhaustion of
benefits, she would automatically be eligible for UI benefits if she was to lose her new job. For this
new unemployment spell, the benefit duration is equal to the maximum of her new entitlement and
the remainder of her past entitlement.
The unemployed who exhaust their UI entitlement are eligible for a permanent (and flat) unem-
ployment benefit (the Special Solidarity Allowance or Allocation de Solidarité Spécifique) provided
they have worked at least five years during the ten years preceding their entry into unemployment.
Because of this strong eligibility condition, this benefit is treated here as an insurance benefit, and
the beneficiaries are considered as type-1 unemployed.
Finally, all the unemployed who fail to meet the UI eligibility criteria or have exhausted their
11For example, in December 1997, the number of individuals registered for unemployment insurance according to
the UI agency (Unedic) was 2,351,549, while the corresponding estimate using the ECHP was roughly 30% lower,
equal to 1,631,262. Similarly, 956,132 individuals were receiving UA benefits according to the UA agency (Cnaf),
and only 385,809, i.e. 60% less, according to the ECHP.
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entitlement12 can still receive a permanent, means tested social assistance benefit, the RMI (Revenu
Minimum d’Insertion), which is essentially added to the household income so as to reach a minimum
income level. While the actual benefit received varies thus across households depending on their
composition and income level, here we assume that each unemployed not entitled to UI receives
the maximum benefit level.13
We then apply the French UI eligibility rules to the individuals -employed and unemployed- in
our sample in order to construct monthly series of UI eligibility and entitlement. We first consider
the employed workers of our sample. Any employee who has worked for at least 4 months during
the preceding 8 months or whose past UI benefits are not exhausted, is eligible for UI benefits
upon future job loss, and in our model this means being a type-1 employee. If neither of these
conditions is satisfied, an employee losing her job is only eligible for UA benefits, and is thus a
type-2 employee. Since the retrospective employment history goes back to January 1993, we can
construct a monthly series of UI eligibility for the employed from September 1993 onwards.
Determining whether an unemployed worker of our sample is entitled to UI in a given month
is somewhat more complicated since both her maximum benefit duration and her unemployment
duration need to be known. While the latter is directly available in the data set, the former
depends on the length of her contributions to UI during the 24 months preceding unemployment
and has to be reconstructed using the monthly information on employment status. Since the
retrospective employment history goes back to January 1993, this method allows us to reconstruct
the UI entitlement status for all the individuals who entered unemployment after December 1994.
In practice, we can also determine the UI entitlement status for an extremely large proportion
of the individuals who entered unemployment during 1994,14 and thus apply this method from
January 1994. All the unemployed not eligible for UI benefits are considered as UA recipients
(type-2 unemployed, in our model). In this way, we are able to reconstruct the monthly series of
UI eligibility for 9,515 individuals from January 1994 to December 2000.
4.1.2 Transitions
In accordance with the legislation, and as represented in Figure 1, there exist 4 labor market
states, but only six types of transitions, namely job separations for each type of employee, job
findings for each type of unemployed, and changes in eligibility status for either the employed or the
unemployed. We thus consider a 4-state homogeneous Markov model with 6 possible transitions.
We impose a Cobb-Douglas matching function with constant returns to scale and parameter 12 ,
implying  () = − 12 .15
12Except those who are under the age of 25 and have no children.
13 In December 1997, for example, two out of three beneficiaries received the maximum benefit level (Collin, 2000).
14For instance, if, when entering unemployment, the individual has worked at least 14 months since January 1993,
then she is entitled to 30 months of benefits which is the maximum duration and this allows us to determine her UI
eligibility status over the unemployment spell. We can also determine the monthly UI eligibility status during all the
unemployment spell when the eﬀective unemployment duration is shorter than the maximum benefit duration.
15For the choice of the elasticity of match with respect to unemployment, we refer in particular to Blanchard and
Diamond (1989) and Burda and Wyplosz (1994). For the U.S., Blanchard and Diamond (1989) find an elasticity
with respect to unemployment varying between 0.4 and 0.6 depending on the specification. For France, Burda and
Wyplosz (1994) estimate a parameter close to 0.5.
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We first show that the dynamic structure of the model provides a good description of the
French labor market and reproduces well its main characteristics. To this end, we initially estimate
the monthly transition probabilities across labor market states non parametrically and ignoring
individual heterogeneity.16 Since the steady state equilibrium conditions (5)-(7) are completely de-
termined by the transition rates (, , ,  12 ), we can simulate the unemployment rate, the average
unemployment duration, and the proportion of the unemployed who receive UI benefit payments,
and compare them with the oﬃcial figures provided by the French Institute of Statistics and the
UI agency for 1994-2000. The model reproduces well the observed unemployment rate (1137%
versus 117%) and the average unemployment duration (1572% versus 1526%), and provides a
fairly reasonable approximation for the UI recipiency rate (6645% versus 552%).17
Our theoretical model applies to a representative individual and reforms to the unemployment
compensation system must be simulated on this representative individual for equilibrium eﬀects to
be accounted for. We thus extend the basic model to allow for time-constant and time-dependant
covariates, and model the transition probabilities by multinomial logit regressions. Let  denote
the state occupied at time  by an individual. The probability to transit from state  to  between
dates − 1 and  is then
 () = Pr ( =  |−1 = ;  ) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
exp(0)
1+

 6=
exp(0)   6= 
1
1+

 6=
exp(0)   = 

where  is a vector of individual characteristics (sex, age, level of education, number of children,
citizenship) common to all individuals whatever their labor market status. The parameters  are
estimated by maximum likelihood (see Table A2 in the Appendix for the results). The eﬀects of
age, education, and sex have the expected sign. For instance, women and young workers experience
a higher risk of losing their job than men and older workers.
The transition probability between states  and  for the representive individual (see Table
1) is then simply computed as an average of this transition across types of individuals. The
transformation probability of type-2 jobs into type-1 jobs is quite high, 24%. As a consequence, a
type-2 employee has a much higher probability of becoming eligible the next month than of losing
her job (0977%). The job finding probability is low, with only 65% of the unemployed going out
of unemployment each month. Lastly, 317% of UI recipients exhaust their entitlement each month
and become UA recipients.
4.1.3 Earnings
In order to compute the monthly wages in type-1 and type-2 jobs, we use the annually reported
wages and the employment histories of workers. More precisely, we divide the annual wages by
16We find that  = 0816,  12 = 636,  = 31, and  = 23.
17Our model over-estimates the proportion of the unemployed entitled to UI. The fit of the UI recipiency rate to
the oﬃcial figure would be significantly improved if UI recipients were allowed to find jobs at higher rate than UA
recipients or if the employees not eligible for UI were allowed to have a higher separation rate than those who are
eligible. However these diﬀerences would be inconsistent with the assumption of a representative individual.
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the number of months during which a given individual has occupied respectively a type-1 and a
type-2 position, which gives  the wage paid in state  at date . Then controlling for observed
heterogeneity we estimate:  =  0 + ,  = 1 2. The eﬀects of individual characteristics on
wages present a familiar picture, with women receiving wages that are on average 29% lower than
men in type-1 jobs, and 216% lower in type-2 jobs (Table A3, Appendix).
Computing the expected wage in state  for each individual and then averaging out, we obtain
the monthly wage for the representative individual (see Table 1). As the entitlement status is related
to job tenure, type-1 employees typically receive a better wage (1366.6) than type-2 employees
(856.7). It is also worth noting that the average wage paid in type-2 jobs is above the legal
minimum wage (798 on average over 1994-2000), which motivates our assumption of a negotiated
wage for type-2 jobs versus the alternative hypothesis of an exogenously determined wage.
The UI benefit received by a given unemployed individual in each month is constructed using
the UI legislation. First, from the duration of contributions, the age, and the previous labor
earnings, we infer the UI category each unemployed individual belongs to and the benefit paid at
the beginning of the unemployment spell. Second, applying the rules of this UI category (Table
A1), we simulate the sequence of UI benefits over time, 1 (). After a certain period of time,
the benefit is reduced by a fixed fraction (15 or 17% depending on the category of benefits) in
regular intervals. Controlling for observed heterogeneity, we estimate 1 =  0+ and from the
parameters b we deduce 1 for the representative individual (Table 1).18
Finally, each UA recipient is aﬀected a monthly income 2 corresponding to full RMI allowance
(3236 in average in the period under consideration).
4.1.4 Calibration
The ECHP survey thus allows us to estimate five of the parameters (, , , 1, 2) and three of
the endogenous variables ( 12 , 1, 2) of the model (see Table 1).
Table 1: The estimated transitions and earnings for the representative individual (% and euros)
  12   1 2 1 2
0977 65 317 24 13666 8567 6966 3236
Source: French sample of the ECHP, Insee, 1994-2000.
However, it does not provide any information on the six remaining parameters, namely the cost
of posting a vacancy (), the scale parameter of the matching function (), the productivity (),
the discount rate (), the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient (1 − ), and the bargaining power of
workers (). For the model to be identified, we have to make additional assumptions on three of
these parameters. We assume that  = 001,  = −05, and  = 005. The values chosen for  and
 are standard in the literature. Then ,  and  can be deduced so as to match the endogenous
variables ( 12 , 1, 2) using the chosen and estimated parameters. Table 2 presents the chosen and
18For detailed results, see Table A3 (Appendix). Women are shown to receive lower UI benefits than men. In
addition, as benefits positively depend on the past wage, the observed benefit level increases with age and education.
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deduced parameters for the representative individual. The value of  satisfies the Hosios (1990)
rule.
Table 2: Other parameters for the representative individual
     
56181 005 1517 05 001 −05
Source: French sample of the ECHP, Insee, 1994-2000.
Using the estimated and deduced parameters, we simulate the three endogenous variables ( 12 ,
1, 2) that helped us to calibrate the model and compare them to their estimated value. The
job finding probability and the wage bargained by the employees not eligible for UI benefits are
perfectly reproduced, while for those who are eligible the simulated wage is significantly lower
than its estimated value (Table 3).19 Finally we deduce the steady-state equilibrium number of
individuals in each state and the equilibrium tax rate  using equations (5)-(7) and the budget
constraint (9) (Table 3).20
Table 3: The simulated variables for the representative individual
 12 1 2 1 2  1 1 2 
65 12378 8567 866 44 1306 6634 8579 114 6958
Source: French sample of the ECHP, Insee, 1994-2000.
4.2 Calibration for Denmark and the U.S.
The calibration for Denmark and the U.S. uses the UI eligibility rules and macro data (average
wage, unemployment rate, monthly separation rate, etc.). When possible, we compute the variables
using the same sources (Statistics Denmark on the one hand and the Bureau of Labor Statistics on
the other hand) and the same period of time (1994-2004).
4.2.1 Denmark
In Denmark, unemployment insurance is a voluntary scheme administered by the unemployment
insurance funds. As we are interested in the eﬀects of changes in the parameters governing un-
employment insurance, we restrict the calibration exercise to those workers who are members of
an insurance fund. To be entitled to UI benefits, an individual must have worked at least 52
weeks within the last three years and been a member of a fund for at least one year. The max-
imum duration of benefits has changed over the period 1994-2004, going from 7 years to 4 years.
19Here, again, the fit of the simulated 1 (Table 3) to the estimated 1 (Table 1) would be significantly improved
if UI recipients were allowed to find jobs at higher rate than UA recipients or if the employees not eligible for UI were
allowed to have a higher separation rate than those who are eligible.
20The unemployment rate amounts to 1306% and two-third of the unemployed receive UI benefits. The employees
not eligible for UI benefits in case of job loss represent only 131% of the employees, which is small but non surpris-
ing, considering that eligibility is very easy to obtain in France. In countries with a less generous unemployment
compensation system, the proportion of employees not eligible for UI benefits would be higher, as for example for
the U.S.
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Then,  = 00833 and  = 0015. The insured unemployed who fail to meet these criteria or have
exhausted their UI entitlement can still receive social benefits administered by municipalities.
In addition to the UI eligibility rules, we use macro data over 1994-2004:  = 548%,  =
3671, 11670, and 2768 from the Statistics Denmark website. We follow Rosholm and Svarer
(2004) and set the separation rate equal to 08% per month.21 Finally, (, , , ) are set at the
same levels as for France.
Adding up (5) and (6) and replacing , , , and  by their values, we find that the job
finding probability ( 12 ) is equal to 1379%, which implies an average unemployment duration of
725 months. Then the productivity ( = 4152), the vacancy cost ( = 49345), and the wages
bargained by the two types of employees (1 = 36798 and 2 = 27382) can be deduced so as to
match the endogenous variables  12 and .
4.2.2 The U.S.
In most States in the U.S., an individual must have worked at least 52 weeks (one year) to be eligible
for unemployment insurance and benefits can be paid for a maximum of 26 weeks (6 months). Then,
 = 00833 and  = 01666. There is no unemployment assistance but diﬀerent programs provide
unemployment benefits for those who have exhausted their UI entitlement.22 The unemployed not
eligible for unemployment insurance or for these programs can receive government food subsidies
in the form of food stamps or cash assistance. The social benefit level (2) is computed as the sum
of food stamps, cash assistance, and benefits paid by the programs divided by the total number of
uninsured unemployed.23
In addition, we use macroeconomic data coming from the Bureau of Labor Statistics over 1994-
2004: 1 = $94947, 1 = $27468,  = 15%, and  12 = 2702%.24 Finally, (, , , ) are set
at the same levels as for France and Denmark. The productivity ( = 3450), the vacancy cost
( = 27946), and the wage of type-2 employees (2 = $22137) are then deduced so as to match
the endogenous variables  12 and 1.
5 Quantifying re-entitlement eﬀects
This section quantifies re-entitlement eﬀects for France, Denmark, and the U.S. To this purpose,
we compare our model with a model as close as possible to ours but where re-entitlement is not at
work. The model used for comparison is simply the standard Pissarides (2000) 2-state model (see
the Appendix), where all the unemployed are indefinitely paid the same unemployment benefit, and
all the employees have the same rights to unemployment benefits after a job separation and receive
the same wage. Clearly, in that model, only the standard disincentive eﬀect of unemployment
21The separation rate is estimated by Rosholm and Svarer (2004) on the CLS longitudinal database over the period
1981-1990. Unfortunately, we could not find an estimate of the monthly separation rate for the period 1994-2004.
22Extended benefits during times of high unemployment, Federal Supplemental Compensation program, Disaster
Unemployment Assistance program, etc.
23All these figures are available at the websites of the U.S. Departments of Labor and Agriculture.
24The transition rates  and  12 are very close to that found by Fallick and Fleischman (2004) on the same period
of time.
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benefits is at work. In our two-tier system, instead, this standard eﬀect is accompanied by a re-
entitlement eﬀect working in the opposite direction. The comparison between the two models is
feasible because the Pissarides model is the limit of our model when  → +∞ and 1 = 2 To
precisely perform this comparison, the unemployment benefit in the Pissarides model is set so as
to match the ex post weighted average obtained in our model, i.e.  ≡ 11+221+2 . The remaining
parameters (,  , , ,  ) are common to both models (see Tables 1 and 2).
A simple way of assessing the extent of re-entitlement eﬀects is to compare the equilibrium
under both models. Both 1 and 2 (and thus the average wage ) in our model are lower
than , the wage bargained over in the Pissarides model and interestingly, the diﬀerence
between  and  is non negligible (−139%), as shown in Table 4. Firms open more
vacancies and thus unemployment is lower by almost one percentage point (−64%). In spite of this,
workers are worse-oﬀ with re-entitlement eﬀects, and in particular the welfare of the unemployed
is significantly lower (−27%). Instead, firms are better-oﬀ by 59%. Finally, the presence of the
re-entitlement eﬀect lowers aggregate welfare by 09% and raises output by 29%. Tables 10 and 11
in the Appendix show that re-entitlement eﬀects are also important in Denmark and the U.S.
Table 4: Comparison between our two-tier system and a unified system for France
   12       
Our model 12328 1306 65 10096 9402 101345 1229 113635 11947 696
Pissarides (2000) 12502 1399 6 10155 966 10305 116 11463 11913 736
A more intuitive way of understanding the extent of re-entitlement eﬀects is to compare the
impact of a 10% increase in both 1 and 2 in our model with a 10% increase in  in the Pissarides
model (see Table 5). For France, the re-entitlement eﬀect lowers by 154% the rise in the average
wage and by 254% the rise in unemployment following a 10% increase in benefit levels. The size of
the eﬀect is comparable for the U.S. (113% and 311% respectively for wages and unemployment),
and smaller for Denmark (85% and 174% respectively for wages and unemployment).
Table 5: Quantifying re-entitlement for France, Denmark, and the U.S.
 
F DK U.S. F DK U.S.
10% increase in 1 and 2 (our model) 145 078 079 552 568 271
10% increase in  (Pissarides, 2000) 171 084 089 74 688 393
Diﬀerence (%) 154 85 113 254 174 311
The observed diﬀerences in the size of the eﬀect for these three countries raise the issue of
whether one could directly infer the extent of re-entitlement eﬀects in a given country from the
parameters (1 2  ) characterizing its unemployment compensation system. The following
simulations show that this is unlikely to be the case, because the size of the eﬀect varies non-
monotonically with respect to some of these parameters.
Figure 2 shows how the size of the re-entitlement eﬀect on wages —measured as the ratio of the
expected wage in our model, , to the wage in the equivalent Pissarides (2000) model, —
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varies with 2, , and  in the French case.25
Panel () shows that the re-entitlement eﬀect monotonically decreases with 2 and vanishes (i.e.
 = 1) for 2 = 1, as already shown in Proposition 1. Indeed, if 1 = 2, the eligibility
and entitlement rules become irrelevant, and 1 = 2 = . Instead, whenever the two-tier
system is not degenerate (i.e. 0    +∞ and 0    +∞), a decrease in 2 relative to 1 makes
type-2 unemployment less attractive, which in turn increases the wedge between 1 and 2, and
drives down  in the two-tier system relative to .
Panel () shows that a shorter entitlement to UI first increases and then decreases the size of
the re-entitlement eﬀect,26 with a turning point at around 13 months. First, for long enough UI
durations (i.e. for  suﬃciently small), the unemployed spend on average so few periods in type-2
unemployment that the values of 1 and 2 are similar, and thus the two-tier system generates lit-
tle incentives for the type-2 unemployed to accept lower wages. As  increases, the future expected
time spent in type-1 unemployment relative to type-2 unemployment becomes increasingly diﬀerent
for individuals currently in diﬀerent types of unemployment, which increases . How-
ever, for  suﬃciently high, both types of unemployed spend very short periods of time in type-1
unemployment in the future, and then  starts decreasing.
Finally, the re-entitlement eﬀect displays the same type of pattern with respect to  (see Panel
()), except that the turning point comes at values of  smaller than those commonly observed,27
25Thus, for each point in the set of parameters, we need to compute the equilibrium of our economy and the
equilibrium of the corresponding Pissarides (2000) economy. The qualitative shape of the curves for Denmark and
the U.S. is the same, except for diﬀerent turning point values for  and .
26The re-entitlement eﬀect vanishes for  = 0 since in that case the economy consists only of type-1 workers which
are paid 1 = , and for  = +∞, as shown in Proposition 1.
27Corresponding to employment requirements for UI entitlement of 83 years for France, 20 years for Denmark,
and 4 years for the U.S.
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implying that we expect the re-entitlement eﬀect to be increasing in the requirement for UI enti-
tlement.
6 Reforming unemployment compensation
We next simulate the eﬀects on unemployment, wages, taxes, welfare, and output, of diﬀerent
reforms “at the margin” to the unemployment compensation system. We examine in turn four
types of reforms that would make the unemployment compensation system more generous: (i)
an increase in the insurance benefit level; (ii) an increase in the assistance benefit level; (iii) an
increase in the duration of UI entitlement; and finally (iv) a reduction in the employment duration
required for UI eligibility. The specific reforms under consideration within each country have all
been designed to produce the same increase in the expected utility of an unemployed worker.
6.1 France
Table 6: Reforms to French unemployment compensation: parameter values
Reform before after % change
(i) 20 increase in UI benefit levels 1 = 69658 1 = 71658 287
(ii) 395 increase in UA benefit levels 2 = 3236 2 = 32755 122
(iii) 55-week increase in UI benefit duration  = 317  = 3052 −373
(iv) 13-week reduction in the employment spell required for UI  = 06208  = 08767 1577
Table 7: Reforming French unemployment compensation
1 2  12 1 2  1 
initially 12378 8567 65 866 439 1306 6634 696
(i) raising 1 12411 8476 644 871 446 1316 6614 714
(ii) raising 2 12387 8607 648 868 442 1310 6627 699
(iii) lowering  1239 8529 647 88 431 1311 6709 702
(iv) raising  12386 803 634 886 448 1335 6641 711
Table 8: Reforming French unemployment compensation: welfare
1 2 1 2    
initially 958 9071 10098 10002 101345 1229 113635 11947
(i) raising 1 9596 9068 10107 10007 101516 12135 113651 11944
(ii) raising 2 9586 9084 10101 10007 101428 1225 113678 11946
(iii) lowering  9587 9070 10102 10005 10144 1223 11367 11946
(iv) raising  9578 9094 10094 10062 101282 122 113482 11938
Note: 1, 2, 1, and 2 are measured with respect to a reference value () ≡ 100 before the reform.
For France, we take as a benchmark a 20 increase in the unemployment insurance benefit.28
28We have chosen a small increase in 1 in order to maintain our discrete time interpretation of the transition
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The parameters of the four reforms under consideration are presented in Table 6, while their impact
is presented in Table 7 (for unemployment rates, wages, job finding rate, recipiency rate, and tax
rate) and Table 8 (welfare).
6.1.1 Raising insurance benefits by 20
Raising the insurance benefit 1 by 20 improves the threat point of UI recipients, which raises the
wage of the employees eligible for UI benefits by 026%. A type-2 employee eventually gaining UI
eligibility is now also paid a better wage and receives a higher UI benefit upon future separation.
As a consequence, getting a type-2 job becomes more attractive in the first place, which puts
downward pressure on 2 (-106%). The large negative impact on 2 and the small positive impact
on 1 suggest that re-entitlement eﬀects are quantitatively relevant. The average wage increases
as a result of the reform and firms choose to open fewer vacancies, which results in a higher
unemployment rate (+088%). In addition, more UI recipients tend to exhaust their entitlement
and start receiving assistance benefits, which translates into a lower equilibrium UI recipiency rate
(1 ).
Unsurprisingly, the type-1 unemployed benefit the most from an increase in 1, followed by type-
1 employees, who would enjoy higher 1 upon job loss Type-2 employees are the next in line and
only slightly better-oﬀ, as they first have to gain eligibility before being able to enjoy higher wages
and higher benefits upon job loss. Yet the type-2 unemployed lose from this reform, both because
of a lower unemployment exit rate and lower wages. On the whole, despite lower employment and
UI recipiency rate, the utilitarian welfare of workers () is slightly higher. By contrast, firms
experience a 13% decline in their welfare due to higher wages. Yet aggregate welfare ( ) increases
and net output ( ) declines.29
6.1.2 Raising assistance benefits
Consider next a 395 increase in 2 This strengthens the threat point of UA recipients (2) in the
bargaining process and enables them to negotiate a wage 2 higher by 047%. In addition, from
equation (15), this reform slightly improves the threat point of UI beneficiaries who negotiate a
wage higher by 007% The rise in 1 is much smaller than the rise in 2 since UI entitlement is
only lost with probability 00317 each month. Also, the elasticity of 2 with respect to 2 (039)
is much bigger than the elasticity of 1 with respect to 1 (009). Then, both wages being higher,
firms open fewer vacancies, and  falls. Unsurprisingly, a higher unemployment rate (+023%)
is thus associated to this reform. Thus more UI recipients exhaust their entitlement and the UI
recipiency rate falls.
In welfare terms, UA recipients are those who benefit the most, as they receive a higher benefit.
This leads their expected utility to rise with elasticity 012. For the three other groups, the pos-
probabilities: with a larger increase in 1 the utility comparable reduction in the employment spell required for UI
would have been reached for   1
29Net output is given by  =  − . As UI benefits become more generous, both the value of production 
and the cost of vacancies  decrease. When the initial unemployment compensation system is generous, the fall in
output dominates and net output declines.
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sibility of receiving higher UA benefits in the future quantitatively dominates the negative eﬀects
associated to higher taxes and/or lower transitions into employment. Moreover, the groups whose
transition rate from their current state into social assistance is higher benefit more from the reform.
In contrast with the increase in insurance benefits, raising assistance benefits thus improves the
situation of all four groups of workers.30 Another important diﬀerence is that producing a given
improvement in the expected utility of an unemployed is much cheaper by raising 2 than by raising
1 (a 044% instead of a 29% associated increase in taxes). In all other respects, the two policies are
similar, as they both increase the utilitarian welfare of workers and total welfare, while worsening
the welfare of firms and reducing (to a small extent) total output.
6.1.3 Increasing the duration of UI entitlement
Consider now a 55-week increase in UI benefit duration from the initial 137-week duration. Simi-
larly as with the increase in 1, this reform makes employment more attractive for UA recipients,
while UI beneficiaries are now less eager to accept a job. The re-entitlement eﬀect thus explains
why 2 falls, while 1 only increases slightly after this large increase in duration. We unsurprisingly
observe a fall in UA recipients (2) accompanied by a rise in UI recipients (1). As the latter is
bigger than the former, unemployment rises, but less than after the increase in 1.
The welfare eﬀects are qualitatively similar to those produced by the change in 1. The type-2
unemployed lose from the reform, but less than after the increase in 1, while all the other groups
of workers gain. More generally, while both raising the UI benefit level and extending entitlement
are two ways of making the UI system more generous, our results show that extending entitlement
may be preferable. Extending entitlement is much cheaper than raising 1, both in terms of the
associated tax rise and additional cost per unemployed.31 Moreover, the increase in total welfare
is higher, while the decrease in output and in the value of type-2 unemployment is lower.
6.1.4 Reduction in the employment spell required for UI eligibility
We next study the eﬀect of a reduction in the employment spell required for UI entitlement from
18 to 5 weeks. Easier eligibility makes the type-2 unemployed more eager to get a job, as they
expect to become eligible for UI benefits much more rapidly. This puts downward pressure on the
negotiated wage and leads to a 63% decline in 2. At the same time, the type-1 unemployed enjoy
initially a better threat point, given that access into type-1 employment is now much easier after
exhaustion of their UI rights. For this reason, 1 slightly increases. Despite the strong decline in
2, easier eligibility raises the proportion of UI recipients and thus the average threat point of an
unemployed worker. As a result, firms end up paying on average slightly higher wages and opening
less vacancies, which in turn translates into a 226% rise in unemployment.
Turning to welfare, type-2 employees are better-oﬀ because of the future gains associated to
their much faster access into type-1 employment outweight the fall in their present income (2).
30However, this reform is not Pareto-improving for workers as the associated increase in type-2 unemployment
implies that more workers end-up in a low utility state.
31Raising 1 costs 1238 per unemployed and requires a 294% increase in taxes, while extending entitlement costs
only 28 per unemployed and requires a 084% increase in taxes.
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The same type of argument applies to type-2 employees, even though with smaller associated
gains because both the fall in 2 and the faster access into type-1 employment are more heavily
discounted. However, the other two groups of workers actually lose from this reform due to a lower
probability of finding a job and/or a higher tax rate.
More importantly, while this reform —as all the other reforms under consideration— ends up
lowering output and firms’ welfare, easier eligibility is the only reform which has the specific feature
of lowering also the utilitarian welfare of workers and social welfare.32 This shows that alternative
ways of rendering unemployment compensation more generous may not only diﬀer in terms of the
identity of the winners and losers, but may actually also result in opposite aggregate welfare eﬀects.
Intuitively, the French unemployment compensation system may actually be already too generous
in the eligibility dimension, which would explain why easier eligibility lowers welfare. This issue will
be studied in detail in section 6 when we identify the characteristics of the optimal unemployment
compensation system for France.
6.2 Denmark and the U.S.
This section studies reforms to the Danish and U.S. unemployment compensation systems and
relates them to our findings for France. For comparison purposes, the benchmark reforms in
Denmark and the U.S. consist respectively in a 20 and 30$ increase in 1. As in the French
case, alternative reforms are designed to produce the same increase in the expected utility of an
unemployed worker within each given country. Tables 12 and 13 in the Appendix report the values
of the parameters of the four reforms under consideration, while Tables 14 and 15 report the impact
of the reforms.
Although the impact of the reforms shares many common qualitative features across countries,33
some diﬀerences must be noted. First, all four ways of rendering unemployment compensation more
generous end up producing an increase in U.S. net output ( = −), while  remains constant
in Denmark and slightly declines in France. The diﬀerential increase in U.S. net output comes from
the fact that its initial unemployment compensation system is less generous in all four dimensions
than the two other systems:34 for initially less generous unemployment compensation systems, an
increase in the generosity of the system reduces instantaneous output  to a lower extent than the
associated decline in vacancy costs .
Finally, an important diﬀerence among the three countries resides on the opposite welfare impact
of easier eligibility. More precisely, easier eligibility reduces both workers’ utilitarian welfare and
32The same type of result applies for small increases in .
33 In particular, in all three countries, (i) all the reforms produce higher unemployment, taxes and a lower firms’
welfare; (ii) raising UI benefits and increasing the duration of UI entitlement produce opposite sign variations for
1 and 2, and increase utilitarian welfare  and aggregate welfare  ; (iii) raising UA benefits increases both
1 and 2, improves the welfare of each group of workers, utilitarian welfare, and aggregate welfare; and (iv) easier
eligibility produces opposite sign variations in 1 and 2, and a higher utility for type-2 workers (both employed and
unemployed).
34The level of UI benefits relative to productivity (1) is close to 03 for the U.S., and to 04 and 046 respectively
for Denmark and France. The diﬀerence in the generosity of UA benefits is even larger, as 2 is close to 007 for the
U.S., and to 018 and 021 respectively for Denmark and France. Finally, the U.S. requires the longest employment
period in order to get eligilibity (together with Denmark) and has the shortest UI entitlement.
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total welfare in France, while for Denmark workers’ welfare increases but total welfare still declines,
and for the U.S. both variables actually end up rising. This diﬀerential impact is likely again to be
linked to the diﬀerence in the initial degree of generosity. France has the easiest initial eligibility
requirement (roughly 4 months), and while the U.S. and Denmark share the same requirement
(one year), the Danish system is much more generous in all other dimensions. Thus, one would
expect that France should move towards tighter eligilibity in order to improve welfare, while the
U.S. should move in the opposite direction. In order to properly address this type of issue, the
next section identifies the welfare-maximizing unemployment compensation systems for these three
countries.
7 Optimal unemployment compensation
While the analysis of reforms at the margin is interesting because they are likely to be easier
to implement from a political economy perspective than “large” reforms, we here also provide a
numerical illustration of how the current unemployment compensation systems may stand with
respect to the optimal systems. Table 9 compares for each of the three countries the current system
with the system that maximizes social welfare  . As our model is quite stylized, the specific
values characterizing the optimal systems should be interpreted with care. More specifically, we
are interested only in assessing whether the unemployment compensation systems should be more
generous or not along the four specified dimensions (1, 2, , ).35
In all three countries, the optimal system is a two-tier system with non-automatic UI eligibility.36
Compared with the current system, both unemployment benefits levels are higher in the optimal
system, and this finding applies to the three countries. For instance, in the case of France, the
optimal 1 and 2 are higher by respectively 22% and 75%. The optimal time profile of benefits is
decreasing, a result obtained in most previous studies (Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997, Fredriksson
and Holmlund, 2001, Coles and Masters, 2006, Pavoni, 2009). However, for all three countries, the
optimal slope of the decrease is flatter than the current slope, with an optimal ratio 12 in the
interval [1.5, 1.6].37 As a result, the optimal wage diﬀerential between type-1 and type-2 employees
is also lower (12 ' 1067 in the three countries).
For France and Denmark, currently characterized by long UI entitlements, the decrease in
incentives generated by the higher level of compensation and the flatter time-profile of benefits is
partly compensated for by a shorter optimal duration of UI benefits. While the decrease in duration
is small in France, it is much more important in Denmark because the current Danish system is
particularly generous along this dimension. In contrast, for the U.S., the optimal duration of UI
entitlement is longer by 9 months than the current duration, which implies an optimal duration
35We expect the optimal unemployment compensation systems to be more generous overall than the existing
systems. Indeed, given that our measure for optimality is  =  + , and that  is generally at least ten
times bigger that  , the evolution of  is mainly driven by the evolution of  As  generally increases with
the generosity of the unemployment compensation system, we expect the same to apply to  in most cases.
36The welfare-maximizing two-tier system leads for each of the countries to a higher  than the best one-tier
system and than the best two-tier system with automatic eligibility.
37This optimal ratio is smaller than that found by Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) for the U.S. (close to 2), but
higher than that found by Coles and Masters (2006) also for the U.S.
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Table 9: Current and optimal unemployment compensation.
France Denmark U.S.
Current Optimal Current Optimal Current Optimal
1 6966 849 1670 2827 9495 2263
2 3236 566 768 1754 2312 1422
 317 396 15 604 1666 64
 24 158 833 173 833 23
 1136 1154 3624 3661 2586 2844
 1013 1056 3375 3483 2317 2729
 1229 98 249 177 269 115
 1195 1186 3718 3705 2839 2894
1 661 462 893 546 579 543
close to 15 months. This last result is, for example, very diﬀerent from that obtained by Fredriksson
and Holmlund (2001), who find an optimal duration of UI entitlement even shorter than the current
duration in the U.S. (17 versus 26 months). This diﬀerence comes from the consideration of non-
automatic eligilibity in our case.
In all three countries, not only it is optimal to impose a minimum employment duration for
UI eligibility, but the optimal requirement is much stronger than the current one.38 For example,
French workers should be employed for 53 years (instead of 4 months) before gaining entitlement
to UI, and U.S. workers for 36 years (instead of for 1 year). In our numerical illustration, the
optimal requirement for entitlement is thus particularly long. This is likely to be related to our
assumption of exogenous search intensity, in the sense that we ignore here how the length of the
entitlement period aﬀects job search decisions and job acceptance decisions. In other words, a
shorter entitlement period may provide incentives to search more intensively for a job, something
which is missing in this model.
In all three countries, all groups of workers would improve their situation by moving from the
current to the optimal system. However, the welfare gains are much bigger in the U.S., where the
shift to the optimal system is even Pareto-improving.39
8 Conclusion
Our paper analyzes the implications of non-automatic eligibility in an equilibrium matching model
with Nash bargaining. We show that time-varying benefits and non automatic eligibility generate re-
entitlement eﬀects through wages, and end up producing a two-point equilibrium wage distribution.
Moreover, as the wage diﬀerential exclusively comes from the re-entitlement eﬀect, wage dispersion
becomes a natural measure of the extent of re-entitlement eﬀects
We simulate our model for France using transition probabilities and earnings estimated on the
same individuals and the same period controlling for observed heterogeneity. We also calibrate our
38As a consequence of the stronger eligibility requirement, the proportion of the unemployed not entitled to UI is
higher in the optimal system, but those unemployed are better-oﬀ since they receive a higher benefit.
39For the U.S., 2 in the optimal system is larger than 1 in the initial system.
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model for Denmark and the US, two countries with strongly diverse unemployment compensation
systems.
Next we quantify the size of the re-entitlement eﬀect by comparing the impact of a same increase
in benefit levels in our model and in a model in all points similar to ours except for time-varying
benefits and non-automatic eligibility. We find that the re-entitlement eﬀect lowers significantly
the increase in wages and unemployment in all three countries considered.
Finally, we show that in all three countries the optimal compensation system is characterized
by time-decreasing unemployment benefits and non-automatic eligibility for UI, with higher levels
of both UI and UA benefits, a smaller decrease in benefits over time, and a longer employment
requirement for UI eligibility than in the current system. However, while the welfare gains generated
by moving from the current system to the optimal system are large for the U.S., they are found to
be small in France and Denmark.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 For   +∞, 1  2, and 0    +∞ Proposition 1 is proved by
contradiction. Assume 1 ≤ 2. Subtracting (12) from (11) gives: ( + + ) (1−2) = 2−1.
Then 1 ≤ 2 implies that 1 ≥ 2. The solutions to the Nash bargaining problems are given by:
1 − 1 = (1− )
³ 
1−
´
1−11 and 2 − 2 = (1− )
³ 
1−
´
2−12 . Then subtracting the
second equation from the first yields to: 1 − 1 −2 + 2 = (1− )
³ 
1−
´ h
1−11 − 2−12
i
.
Since  ≤ 1, the assumption 1 ≤ 2 implies that 1 − 1 −2 + 2 ≥ 0.
Next, subtracting (18) from (17) and rearranging gives:
( + + ) (1 − 1 −2 + 2)=  [1(1− )]− [2(1− )]− ( + ) (1 − 2) (30)
From (15) and (16) assuming that 1  2, we get: 1 − 2  0. Therefore if 1 ≤ 2, it follows
that the right-hand side of (30) is negative. This implies that 1 − 1 − 2 + 2  0, which is in
contradiction with the assumption 1 ≤ 2. Thus, 1  2
Table A1 - Unemployment insurance rules in France
A – January 1994 – December 1996 
Category Contribution 
duration 
Age Duration at full 
rate (months) 
Stage duration 
(months) 
% of 
decrease 
Compensation 
duration (months) 
0 < 4 months during 
the last 8 months 
Indifferent 0 0 0 0 
1 4 months during the 
last 8 months 
Indifferent 0  4  25 4  
2 6 months during the 
last 12 months 
Indifferent 4  4  15 7  
3 < 50 years 4  4  17 15  
4 
8 months during the 
last 12 months  50 years 7  4  15 21  
5’ < 25 years 7  4  17 30  
5 25-50 years 9  4  17 30  
6 
14 months during the 
last 24 months 
 50 years 15   4  15 45  
7 50-55 years 20  4  15 45  
8 
27 months during the 
last 36 months  55 years 27  4  8 60  
B – January 1997 – June 2001 
Category Contribution 
duration 
Age Duration at full 
rate (months) 
Stage duration 
(months) 
% of 
decrease 
Compensation  
duration (months) 
0 < 4 months during 
the last 8 months 
Indifferent 0 0 0 0 
1 4 months during the 
last 8 months 
Indifferent 4  0  0 4  
2 6 months during the 
last 12 months 
Indifferent 4  6  15 7  
3 < 50 years 4  6  17 15  
4 
8 months during the 
last 12 months  50 years 7  6  15 21  
5 < 50 years 9  6  17 30  
6 
14 months during the 
last 24 months  50 years 15   6  15 45  
7 50-55 years 20  6  15 45  
8 
27 months during the 
last 36 months  55 years 27  6  8 60  
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Table A2 - Transitions
 s 2/1A  p d 
Constant -3.713 (0.045) -2.215 (0.04) -1.192 (0.048) -3.156 (0.1) 
Female 0.197 (0.034) -0.313 (0.033) 0.019 (0.038) 0.185 (0.077) 
Male Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
Age < 30 Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
Age 30-40 -0.916 (0.046) -0.361 (0.042) 0.021 (0.054) 0.050 (0.104) 
Age 40-50 -1.436 (0.049) -0.594 (0.046) 0.016 (0.056) 0.050 (0.107) 
Age > 50 -1.647 (0.064) -1.689 (0.07) 0.037 (0.075) -0.237 (0.109) 
No diploma  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
Vocational diploma -0.254 (0.044) 0.324 (0.041) 0.045 (0.051) -0.262 (0.09) 
High school graduate -0.465 (0.057) 0.298 (0.053) 0.028 (0.06) -0.336 (0.128) 
College graduate -0.903 (0.057) 0.301 (0.052) 0.065 (0.059) -0.639 (0.141) 
No child Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
1 child -0.113 (0.045) -0.136 (0.042) -0.030 (0.05) 0.038 (0.099) 
2 children -0.145 (0.056) -0.213 (0.052) -0.009 (0.062) -0.172 (0.124) 
 3 children 0.056 (0.084) -0.266 (0.081) -0.001 (0.087) 0.134 (0.173) 
French citizenship Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
Other citizenship 0.026 (0.057) 0.010 (0.052) 0.056 (0.06) -0.166 (0.121) 
N° of individuals 9763 
Source: French sample of the ECHP, Insee, 1994-2000. Estimation by maximum likelihood. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Reference: a man, aged less than 30, with no diploma, French citizen, and without children. 
Table A3 - Wages and UI benefits
 1w  2w  1b  
Constant 7.887 (0.266) 6.817 (0.243) 5.356 (0.15) 
Female -4.853 (0.181) -2.107 (0.202) -2.007 (0.116) 
Male Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
Age < 30 Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
Age 30-40 2.807 (0.254) 1.432 (0.291) 0.364 (0.152) 
Age 40-50 5.744 (0.249) 1.495 (0.325) 1.753 (0.161) 
Age > 50 8.117 (0.278) 2.260 (0.466) 2.913 (0.215) 
No diploma  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
Vocational diploma 2.327 (0.243) 0.891 (0.251) 0.816 (0.147) 
High school graduate 6.173 (0.3) 1.577 (0.315) 2.378 (0.189) 
College graduate 10.855 (0.273) 4.149 (0.302) 4.198 (0.192) 
No child Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
1 child 0.648 (0.23) -0.255 (0.253) 0.298 (0.153) 
2 children 0.562 (0.213) -0.949 (0.361) 0.111 (0.184) 
 3 children 0.313 (0.472) -1.296 (0.438) -0.143 (0.285) 
French citizenship Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
Other citizenship -0.838 (0.365) -0.375 (0.312) -0.107 (0.21) 
N° of individuals 6.7433 
Source: French sample of the ECHP, Insee, 1994-2000. Wages and benefits are in € divided by 100. Estimation by 
maximum likelihood. Reference: a man, aged less than 30, with no diploma, French citizen, and without children.
A version of Pissarides (2000) In the standard Pissarides model, workers are in one of two
states: employed or unemployed. All the unemployed receive the same benefit  and all the employ-
ees are paid the same wage . The expected discounted values of employment and unemployment
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are respectively given by  =  [(1− )] + ( − ) and  = [] + ()( − ). Then in
the steady-state equilibrium,  = +() ,  = ()+() , and  = () .
Quantifying the re-entitlement eﬀect for Denmark and the U.S. The equilibrium values
in our model and in the equivalent Pissarides (2000) model are given in Tables 10 and 11:
Table 10: Comparison between our two-tier system and a unified system (Denmark)
   12       
Our model 3671 548 1379 10022 9630 337571 24879 36245 37185 249
Pissarides (2000) 36906 58 1299 10039 9711 338893 24147 36304 37179 262
Table 11: Comparison between our two-tier system and a unified system for the (U.S.)
   12       
Our model 27125 526 2702 10035 9416 231672 26948 25862 28393 132
Pissarides (2000) 28295 633 222 1029 9883 244012 23248 26726 28829 153
Reforms to the Danish and US compensation systems ..
Table 12: Parameter values for the reforms to Danish unemployment compensation
Reform before after % change
(i) 20 increase in the UI benefit level 1 = 1670 1 = 1690 12
(ii) 2251 increase in UA benefit level 2 = 768 2 = 79051 29
(iii) 4-month increase in UI benefit duration  = 15  = 1416 −56
(iv) 205-week reduction in the employment spell required for UI  = 833  = 1328 5941
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Table 13: Parameter values for the reforms to U.S. unemployment compensation
Reform before after % change
(i) 30$ increase in the UI benefit level 1 = 9495 1 = 9795 316
(ii) 223$ increase in UA benefit level 2 = 2312 2 = 23343 096
(iii) 5-week increase in UI benefit duration  = 166  = 163 −216
(iv) 55-week reduction in the employment spell required for UI  = 833  = 931 1179
Table 14: Reforming Danish unemployment compensation
1 2  1 1 2 1 2   
initially 3680 2738 548 8935 9688 9171 10024 9828 100 36245 371852
reform (i) 3683 2727 551 893 9695 9168 10028 9829 10004 36256 371853
reform (ii) 3681 2766 55 8932 9691 9194 10026 9838 10002 36252 371853
reform (iii) 3681 2731 55 8985 9691 9169 10026 9829 10002 36251 371853
reform (iv) 36804 2601 554 8957 9689 9203 10024 9875 10001 36242 371852
Note: 1, 2, 1, and 2 are measured with respect to a reference value () ≡ 100 before the reform.
Table 15: Reforming U.S. unemployment compensation
1 2  1 1 2 1 2   
initially 2747 2214 526 579 9589 9187 10045 9886 100 25862 28393
reform (i) 2750 2208 527 578 9598 9189 10052 9890 10007 25883 28401
reform (ii) 2748 2217 527 578 9594 9195 10049 9891 10004 25875 28399
reform (iii) 27485 2210 527 583 9595 9188 1005 9889 10005 25877 2840
reform (iv) 27477 2194 528 581 9592 9194 10047 9898 10004 25871 28407
Note: 1, 2, 1, and 2 are measured with respect to a reference value () ≡ 100 before the reform.
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